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Article 3

Leading Articles
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW REFORM: PROPOSALS
AND PROSPECTS

Peter Woll*
Recent years have seen public disclosures concerning the activities of the independent regulatory commissions that have
shocked some people, but which were quite predictable to many
seasoned observers. In 1957 the House of Representatives established a Special Subcommittee on Legislative Oversight' to investigate various phases of administrative procedure. 2 The committee
hired a distinguished scholar of administrative law, Bernard
Schwartz, and started on its difficult mission of inquiry into the
state of affairs of the "headless fourth branch" of the government,
i.e., the independent regulatory agencies. 3 This investigation reflected a resurgent interest in administrative procedure that was
to become widespread in government circles, culminating in the
Landis report in December 1960, 4 and subsequently in various proposals made by President Kennedy in his message to Congress on
April 13, 1961 to reorganize this sector of the bureaucracy.5
There is little doubt today that administrative law is of great
importance to the community as a whole, and to the legal profession
* A.B., 1954, Haverford College; Ph.D., 1958, Cornell University. Author, ADmmisTRATiVE LAW: THE INFORMVIAL PROCESS presently being
published by'the University of California Press, and of numerous law
review articles. Presently, Assistant Professor of Political Science at
the University of California, Los Angeles.
I H.R. Res. 99, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957).
2 The subcommittee eventually came under the chairmanship of Oren
Harris, Chairman of the parent Committee on Interstate and Foreign

Commerce.
3

Background material may be found in

SCHWARTZ, THE PROFESSOR AND

THE COMMISSIONS (1959).
4 LANDIS, REPORT ON REGULATORY

AGENCIES TO

THE PRESIDENT-ELECT

(Dec. 1960); reprinted by the

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ADMINIsTRATIVE PRAcTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDIcIARY, 86th

Cong., 2d Sess. (Comm. Print 1960); and by PIKE & FISHER, ADMINIs-

(Dec. 1960.)
5 The President's message to Congress on the regulatory agencies is in
107 CONG. REC. 5356 (daily ed. April 13, 1961).
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in particular. This is simply because of the expanding functions
of government which bring more and more areas under the jurisdiction of administrative agencies. Whether one likes this trend
or not, the fact is that the powers of bureaucracy, already extraordinary, will undoubtedly increase in the future. The scope of
administrative law will expand, and it will be of the utmost importance for the legal profession to come to grips with the field, and
decide realistically the proper role administrative agencies should
have in the legal system. The intricate workings of these agencies
will more frequently than not necessitate informed legal advice to
private parties within their jurisdiction, and, from the standpoint
of the government, much of the work handled by the regulatory
agencies will require legal interpretation and advice from government lawyers. The expansion of administrative law will require
greater legal attention to the exigencies of the administrative process, which will in turn benefit from informed legal judgment.
The purpose of this article is to analyze current administrative
practice in the adjudicative area in relation to various proposals
that have been made for procedural reform. It will be necessary,
first, to review briefly the nature of administrative law. Second,
early attempts made both by the American Bar Association and
the judiciary to control administrative procedure will be noted.
Third, present proposals for reform, which come from a variety of
sources, will be analyzed. Finally, some assessment of the requirements of administrative adjudication from the standpoint of effective and fair government regulation is necessary to indicate possible directions in which the legal profession and the judiciary might
move in making realistic proposals for reform. In various sections
of this article, where relevant, the position of the judiciary with
respect to administrative procedure will be noted.
I.

THE NATURE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

The term "administrative law" may be defined in several ways.
It may refer to the "law" formulated by administrative agencies
through their rule-making powers. In this sense every citizen
has a deep interest in the content of administrative law, which,
when defined in this substantive manner, is equivalent to legislation. This aspect of administrative law concerns the policy-making
powers of bureaucracy, and, although it is not generally the primary
subject of the texts in the field, it is inextricably related to the
procedural features of agency practice. One of the most difficult
problems facing those in the field of administrative law is that of
developing, both theoretically and practically, a proper relationship
between policy-making and adjudication, i.e., between the sub-
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stantive and procedural aspects of regulation. To say that these
aspects of administrative law can be completely separated may
be a profound, albeit common, error. Of course both policy-making
and adjudication involve substantive and procedural issues, but the
essential problem is whether or not policy-making and policy implementation through adjudication can be separated. Policy is
being referred to here as "substantive," and its implementation as
"procedural," regardless of the nature of the issues in each area.
Administrative law is usually defined in terms of its procedural
characteristics, and is equated to administrative adjudication. In
general terms, adjudication involves an adversary proceeding, in
which specific parties participate, and from which a final determination is made subject only to judicial review within definite
legal boundaries. 6 The courts will not accept jurisdiction over an
area where their decisions will be subject to extra-judicial review.7 The fact that channels of review exist does not invalidate
requirements of finality providing the review is carried out within
the judiciary. Thus, a lower court is clearly exercising judicial
power even though its decisions may be subject to review at the
appellate level.
From this general definition of the judicial function it is quite
evident that administrative agencies and courts may exercise virtually identical power from the standpoint of procedure. Both
dispose of specific cases based upon the interpretation of existing
law-whether constitutional, statutory, or administrative. Both may
have final power, within statutorily and judicially defined limits
of review. In many instances both the judiciary and administrative
agencies exercise final power of disposition without the possibility
of judicial review, because of statutory limitations or practical circumstances which make such review meaningless. In this respect
de facto preclusion negates possibilities for review de jure. Where
administrative finality exists, it will stem either from reasons that
preclude private parties from seeking review, or from judicial selfrestraint. The courts can always find sufficient reason to review
any aspect of an administrative case, even where review is limited
or precluded by Congress in the statutes governing the agency.
6 Standards of review vary from court to court, and jurisdiction to

7

jurisdiction, in accordance with the statutory provisions, issues, and
legal personnel involved. It is nevertheless proper to generalize that
the boundaries of such review in many instances theoretically encompass only legal issues, with factual determinations (except where
relevant to such legal areas as evidence) finally decided by the initial
adjudicative body.
Hayburn's Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dail.) 408 (1792); United States v. Ferreira,

54 U.S. (13 How.) 40 (1852).
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Nevertheless, the courts generally will defer to congressional intent;8 and where such intent is not clear, the judiciary frequently
assumes a lack of judicial power to review. In such cases the courts
may take the lack of an affirmative statutory provision for judicial
review as an indication of congressional intent to preclude judicial
scrutiny.9 On the other hand, the courts can always intervene
through the invocation of constitutional issues, regardless of statutory provisions.' 0 This is the exception rather than the rule.
Apart from judicial self-restraint, administrative finality stems
from such practical considerations as the need, in many instances,
of private parties to avoid loss of time and expense, both of which
result from prolonged litigation. To take a case to court is often
simply not worth the effort, even if it appears that there is a strong
possibility of judicial remedy of an adverse administrative decision. Furthermore administrative agencies possess a variety of
sanctions, some of which are automatically invoked when the
8 For example, decisions of the Administrator of Veterans' Affairs are

made conclusive by the statutory provision that such decisions "shall
be final and conclusive on all questions of law and fact, and no other
official or court of the United States shall have jurisdiction to review
by mandamus or otherwise any such decision." 48 Stat. 9 (1933), 38
U.S.C. § 211a (1958). Recent decisions supporting this provision include: Thompson v. Whittier, 185 F. Supp. 306 (D.D.C. 1960); Napier
v. Veterans Administration, 187 F. Supp. 723 (D. N.J. 1960); United
States v. Daubendiek, 25 F.R.D. 50 (N.D. Iowa 1959). Early decisions

of importance include:

Silberschein v. United States, 266 U.S. 221

(1924); Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571 (1934); Meadows v.
United States, 281 U.S. 271 (1930).
9 Schilling v. Rogers, 363 U.S. 666 (1960) provides an interesting illustration of this point. The case contains a vigorous dissent by Justices

Brennan, Black, Douglas, and Chief Justice Warren, who felt that the
majority of the Court was too quick to accept preclusion of judicial
review in the absence of a clear congressional mandate.

10 This is essentially what the Court did in the sensitive field of alien

deportation in Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33 (1950). Here
Congress had not expressly provided for hearings in deportation
proceedings, but the Court held that the Constitution requires such
hearings; therefore the Administrative Procedure Act § 5 applies regardless of the fact that there is no express statutory hearing requirement. (The Administrative Procedure Act, 60 Stat. 239 [1946],
5 U.S.C. § 1001 [1958], will hereinafter be cited as APA § ___.)
As
the Court noted, the requirements of the APA "exempt hearings of
less than statutory authority, not those of more than statutory au-

thority." Regardless of this relatively clear judicial mandate, Congress specifically exempted proceedings involving the exclusion or
expulsion of aliens from the APA in the Immigration and Nationality
Act of 1952, 66 Stat. 109, 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (1958).
courts acquiesced to congressional intent.

After this act, the
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agency announces it is going to take formal action against a private
party. A good illustration of such sanctions is publicity which may
result from a formal charge of illegality, and which may produce
extreme hardships on the parties involved in terms of their public
relations. For example, rarely will a party formally challenge a
Securities and Exchange Commission request to alter a registration
statement, for the resulting publicity may destroy the possibility
of successfully marketing the issue. In this type of case the formal
hearing process of the Commission is generally not used, and the
courts are virtually precluded as an effective recourse from adverse
administrative action. More generally, private parties know that
they must establish cordial relationships with regulatory agencies,
and this too may make them hesitate to take a case to court from
fear of future reprisals. Even if such a fear may be unjustified, a
corporation with a great deal at stake in the long run may not want
to take a short term chance on a relatively inconsequential issue.
It may, therefore, sacrifice its interests in one case to further them
in another. Private parties will always weigh various alternatives of a practical nature before they seek judicial review; and
more often than not they will forgo such review on the basis of
these considerations. These factors, in addition to judicial selfrestraint, and congressional preclusion of review in many types of
cases, increase the likelihood of administrative finality in the exercise of the judicial function. One of the most pressing current
problems is how to deal with the necessarily vast administrative
discretion in the adjudicative process. This problem stems not only
from these limitations upon judicial review, but also from the essentially informal nature of administrative procedure today.

A. TBE NATURE AmD SCOPE OF FomiAL AND INFoRMAL ADmImTRATIVE ADJUDICATION

Generally, each administrative agency involved in adjudication
may be considered to have an informal and a formal process to
settle disputes. Although the term "formal" is somewhat elusive,
it is usually defined in terms of procedures traditionally characteristic of common-law courts. The word "traditionally" is chosen
carefully here, for it is a well known fact that much of what is
done today in the judiciary involves informal procedure. In accordance with common-law theory and practice (to the extent it is
not altered by informal procedure) formal adjudication involves
adequate notice to the participating parties, and a hearing with a
decision based upon the record, from which an appeal may be taken
within proscribed limits. Ideally, the hearing should provide the
opportunity for oral argument, although this has never been set-
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tled in administrative law. In WJR, the Goodwill Station v. FCC1
the District of Columbia Court of Appeals stated categorically that
due process requires oral argument "on every question of law
raised before a judicial or quasi-judicial tribunal.' 1 - On appeal the
United States Supreme Court reversed, stating that "the right of
oral argument as a matter of procedural due process varies from
case to case in accordance with differing circumstances, as do other
procedural regulations." 1 3 The view of the Supreme Court has
prevailed. Specific standards of due process have never been developed by the judiciary or Congress for application to formal
administrative proceedings. Cases involving agency procedure that
have been reviewed by the courts have always been settled on what
is actually an ad hoc basis. In addition, the Administrative Procedure Act of 1946 is extremely ambiguous, and exempts many
14
categories of administrative cases from the provisions of the act.
In contrast to formal administrative adjudication, agencies utilize various methods of informal settlement, not the least important
of which are directed at settling informal cases that have reached
the formal hearing stage. This is a frequently overlooked area of
administrative procedure. It is analogous in one respect to pretrial procedure in the courts, in that attempts are made informally
to sharpen issues and settle by deposition, stipulation, or other
means, matters that are amenable to compromise or not in dispute.
Agencies use such procedure wherever possible to avoid prolonged
and costly hearings. To illustrate the importance of this type of informal disposition, the Internal Revenue Service, through its appellate division machinery, manages to settle through stipulation
approximately ninety per cent of the tax cases petitioned to the
Tax Court (docketed cases). Numerous other instances of various
forms of shortened procedure could be cited, both with respect to
regulatory and non-regulatory agencies. 15 Even where there are
sweeping statutory requirements for hearings, agencies will utilize
every possible device to shorten the proceedings. The Civil Aeronautics Board illustrates this, where prehearing conferences are
employed extensively along with other techniques to reduce the
11 174 F.2d 226 (D.C. Cir. 1948).
12

Id. at 233.

13 FCC v. WJR, the Goodwill Station, 337 U.S. 265, 276 (1949).
14

See APA §§ 4(b),

5, which require certain standards

of procedure

only where a previous statutory requirement for hearing exists; and
§§ 3, 4, 5, 10, which exempt large portions of administration from
the act.
15 See Woll, The Development of Shortened Procedure in American Administrative Law, 45 CORNELL L.Q. 56 (1959).
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burden of statutory hearing provisions. 6 Even though these informal techniques are employed extensively, a great deal of the
criticism of the administrative process today centers upon the thesis that there is too much formality at the hearing stage, thus impeding expeditious disposition of cases. This will be discussed
below.
Apart from informal procedure at the formal hearing stage,
various techniques are used extensively and effectively by administrative agencies to dispose initially of cases before the formal
adjudicative level. Such case settlement involves informal contact
between the agency and the private party concerned, from which
agreement emerges disposing of the issues involved to the satisfaction of both parties. Informal conferences and correspondence are
widely used. In areas involving the application of technical administrative standards, such as that encompassed by FTC requirements for the labeling of wool, fur, and flammable fabrics, agency
inspections may serve as a channel for securing compliance in individual cases. This is essentially informal administrative adjudication. The informal process is often institutional, involving the
participation of several units of the agency in decision-making. This
contrasts with personal decision-making, where "the person who
hears, decides." The latter is possible at both formal and informal
levels of adjudication; the former tends to be more effectively employed in informal adjudication, which is not burdened by standards
of quasi-judicial conduct (emanating from statutes, the courts, or
administrative regulations) that limit the extent to which the in7
stitutional process may be used.'
The scope of informal administrative adjudication is impressive by any standard. In terms of the total picture, over ninety per
cent of the cases arising within administrative jurisdiction are settled informally. Although this is an average, rarely, in particular
16 Id. passim.
17

See APA §§ 5, 7, 8, 11. See also, FCC v. Allentown Broadcasting
Corp., 349 U.S. 358 (1955), reversing, Allentown Broadcasting Corp.
v. FCC, 222 F.2d 781 (D.C. Cir. 1954); Universal Camera Corp. v.
NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951); Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S.
33 (1950). The institutional process essentially involves a combination of functions, to varying degrees, in accordance with the type of
case under consideration.

It is a process in which various groups

contribute their expertise, where appropriate, to the determination of
selected aspects of a case. The APA provisions and the cases noted
above pertain to requirements for the separation of functions within
the administrative process. Insofar as separation is required, and to
the extent that the hearing examiners have final power of disposition
on certain issues, the institutional process of decision-making is necessarily limited.
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categories of cases, is the formal hearing process of equal significance to informal disposition, and virtually never is it of greater
importance. Nor is it possible to dismiss the subject of informal
adjudication by saying that qualitatively the most important cases
are handled through a formal hearing process, although quantitatively the informal process is clearly dominant. The fact is that
by qualitative standards the interests at stake in cases settled informally are of great importance, and are at least equal to those
adjudicated formally. 18
In summary, administrative procedure in adjudication possesses many similarities to court procedure. It is certainly less
formal as a whole; but both the courts and administrative agencies
have the power to dispose of specific cases, with finality, within
proscribed limits of judicial review. From the standpoint of procedure it is accurate to state that the judicial power exercised by
administrative agencies reflects similar problems, and has parallel
implications to that employed by the judiciary, with respect to the
determination of individual obligations and rights.

B.

THE SUBSTANTIVE ELEMENT IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

One of the most important distinctions that must be made between adjudication by administrative agencies on the one hand,
and by the courts on the other, is that substantive policy considerations are more consciously involved in administrative adjudication.
Some consider this to be a major difference. 19 To say that the entry
of policy into administrative decisions of a judicial nature distinguishes administrative from judicial application and interpretation of the law is not to deny the importance of public policy to
judges, nor is it to deny that judges often make public policy. The
difference is one of degree, not of kind. One scholar, concluding
that judges have a creative function when they interpret the law
within the framework of what they consider to be public policy,
notes that "it seems to be only the openly avowed use of the idea of

public policy, as a basis for judicial legislation, from which the
judges are apt to shrink, perhaps because such law-making may
readily be interpreted as a usurpation. For can it be doubted that
in all those other branches of the law where the idea is but rarely
adverted to expressly, it is nevertheless implicit, in each new brick
that is added to the edifice, that the judge's notion of what the
See Woll, Informal Administrative Adjudication: Summary of Findings, 7 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 436 (1960).
19 See Wade, "Quasi-Judicial" and Its Background, 10 CAMB. L.J. 216
(1949).
18
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public interest demands is at least an operative consideration, if not
a decisive one?" 20 Although many lawyers might quarrel with this
statement, it can not be denied that in many instances conceptions
of proper public policy and decisions in specific cases go hand in
hand in the courts.
In contrast to the judiciary, one of the principalpurposes of the
administrative process is to implement public policy in particular
areas established by Congress. Administrative adjudication aids
the function of regulation, which has been delegated to administrative agencies by Congress as a result of various forms of political
pressure favoring government intervention into different spheres.
In other words, there is a conscious political motive which may
or may not enter the process of agency case disposition, but which is
always on the sidelines as a factor to be taken into account. This
fact has profound implications upon the nature of administrative
functions and the structure of agencies. It affects the adjudicative
process not only with respect to the final decision that is made, but
also with regard to the type of case that is handled. The fact that
agencies have a positive policy function causes them to initiate
cases where such action is necessitated by policy considerations.
Here there is a clear distinction between agency and court adjudication, for the latter cannot and will not hear anything other than
a "'case or controversy." The courts have, of course, the power
to select what issues they will decide, and the Supreme Court, in
addition, may often refuse to hear a case at all. In this sense the
courts can be selective. However, their selection must come from
concrete cases that have developed from initiative over which they
have no control. The judge cannot consciously seek out cases to
implement policy; thus, his function is more passive than that of
the administrative agency.
The extent to which substantive issues should be injected into
administrative adjudication is a major point of contention at the
present time. Before analyzing the more important proposals
which deal with this area, it is important to note at this point that
the arguments both for and against the combination of substantive
policy and the adjudication of specific cases are equivocal. There
is no clear-cut answer. Further, the lines of groups supporting one
side or the other are not clearly drawn; thus, although the American Bar Association has taken a stand in favor of greater formalization and separation of functions in the administrative process, there
are many lawyers within and without government who disagree
with this position completely. On the other hand the administra20 LLOYD, PUBLIc POLICY-A CoiPARATvE STUDY iN ENGLISH AND FRENCH
LAw 121-22 (1953).
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tive agencies have opposed with a high degree of consistency the
stand of the American Bar Association; however, this does not prevent many government lawyers and in some instances top agency
officials from speaking out21 in favor of a strict separation of policy
making and adjudication.
From a historical point of view it is evident that Congress,
in establishing government regulation in various areas, purposely
created agencies that could function with a high degree of flexibility, both in interpreting and applying the law. In some instances
Congress consciously removed jurisdiction from the courts and
transferred it to an administrative agency, e.g., in the area of workmen's compensation legislation. In other situations it withheld
jurisdiction from the courts upon the creation of a new regulatory
agency. For example, when Congress established the Federal Trade
Commission in 1914, it provided for independent powers of enforcement so that the FTC would not have to rely upon judicial action
to carry out policy in the field of monopoly control and in the regulation of business practices. This distinguishes it from the Justice
Department, which must seek enforcement in the courts. By 1914
Congress realized that previous legislation, viz. the Sherman Act of
1890 which vested the power of enforcement jointly with the Attorney General and circuit courts (changed to district courts in
1911), had failed to provide vigorous implementation of anti-trust
policy. 22 The courts were unsympathetic to legislative goals; hence,
they were not applying the law in accordance with congressional
standards. Congress wanted substantive issues injected into antitrust adjudication, but they wanted the "right" standards to be employed. Apart from present and past attacks upon the combination
of legislative and judicial functions in the hands of one agency, it
may be objectively stated that this was the design of Congress in
establishing such regulatory agencies in the first place. This in no
way implies that Congress today should not change its own creation;
21

Hector, Memorandum to the President-Problemsof the CAB and the
Independent Regulatory Commissions (Sept. 10, 1959), reprinted in
Hearings on H.R. 4800 and H.R. 6774 Before the House Committee on
Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 336 (1960).
The CAB reply, prepared by its General Counsel, can be found id. at
412.

22

Sherman Act § 4, 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 4
(1958) provides: "The several district courts of the United States
are invested with jurisdiction to prevent and restrain violations of
this Act; and it shall be the duty of the several district attorneys of
the United States, in their respective districts, under the direction of
the Attorney General, to institute proceedings in equity to prevent
and restrain such violations." The original Act vested jurisdiction in
circuit courts.
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in fact that has already been accomplished to a limited extent
through the APA.
The above considerations raise the extremely complex question concerning the extent to which policy-making and adjudication
can realistically be separated in the administrative process; and at
the same time the issue is raised as to whether or not they should
be separated. If it is decided that there should be a combination
of functions, it is not necessary to deal with the first question. On
the other hand, if a separation of functions is desired, it is necessary
to determine realistically the extent to which this can be accomplished. This issue will be discussed below in relation to proposals
for the separation of functions.
C.

SUMMARY

In summary, the necessity of discussing the policy making
and adjudicative aspects of administrative law as interrelated functions has been illustrated. Further, it is important to note that this
fact does not indicate a unique characteristic of administrative law,
for public policy considerations enter the process of judicial decision-making at numerous points. On the other hand, the administrative process performs a more positive act in this respect than
the judiciary. Its primary purpose is effective regulation in the
public interest, in accordance with congressional standards. Regulation involves policy as much as adjudication, and there is little
doubt that Congress intended that these agencies should adjudicate
in light of substantive policy criteria. This type of regulatory activity, although it may fulfill broad legislative goals, poses problems
to what the lawyer generally describes as "traditional concepts of
fair play" which are embodied in the idea of procedural due process of law. It is now necessary to turn to this aspect of administrative law, which leads directly into a consideration of proposals
that have been made for reform of administrative procedure.
II. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW REFORM, 1933-1946
It is of importance to review briefly early attempts to control
administrative procedure made by the American Bar Association
and the judiciary, for therein is contained the theoretical basis of
current proposals made by these same groups. It is interesting to
note that at this early stage these groups (lawyers and judges) more
or less monopolized the scene involving the development of the
administrative process. Historically lawyers dominated the administrative branch of the government much in the same way that
they controlled Congress. The government of the United States
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is supposed to be a government of law, and this reason, among
others, gives to lawyers a certain status and expertise that at
times is unchallenged. It would be a mistake of great magnitude to
assume conformity of attitude among the legal profession. Relative
to other groups there is generally a greater awareness of the legal
aspects of particular problems among lawyers, and perhaps a
greater respect for procedural protection in adjudication. Beyond
this there are sharp contrasts within the group. Nevertheless,
during the early part of the New Deal, as administrative agencies
were created with a degree of rapidity that astounded many, the
American Bar Association took an official stand in relation to the
control of administrative law, and it was later instrumental in
securing the passage of legislation for this purpose. The judiciary
also attempted to deal with administrative law on a relatively consistent basis. Many lawyers, of course, who worked for both new
and old administrative agencies, took a stand in sharp opposition
to the American Bar Association. This tendency increased as the
agencies became more highly developed, and today much of the
opposition from within government to American Bar Association
proposals comes from agency lawyers. In the area of administrative law reform, however, agency lawyers were not initially very
vocal in their representation of views that differed from the American Bar Association and they had virtually no influence upon
legislation in this field. This situation changed as administrative
agencies gained power and prestige, as well as political support
from clientele groups. By 1946, the date of the passage of the
APA, the voice of regulatory agencies of various types was being
felt in Congress.
The initial question that must be asked when dealing with the
subject of reform of administrative procedure is: what is all the fuss
about? With respect to proposals coming from the American Bar
Association, why was this group so concerned with the development
of administrative law? The answer is both very simple and very
complex. It concerns, to some degree, human motivation, a very
difficult area in which to arrive at accurate conclusions. Put in
simple terms, the American Bar Association was concerned with
administrative law because it involved the exercise of judicial
functions; thus it involved an area of expertise possessed solely by
a. group for which the American Bar Association was spokesman.
This function had been traditionally handled by the courts, a milieu
in which the lawyer functions with knowledge and ease. With the
development of judicial functions outside of this medium, the lawyer becomes uncomfortable until it is structured in a manner familiar to him. Thus it was natural for the American Bar Associa-
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tion to attempt to shape the administrative process in the image
of the courts, at least insofar as judicial functions were involved.
Judicial power had been traditionally exercised within the framework of court procedure, and the administrative process had to conform if it was not to violate the Anglo-American legal tradition. Of
course, there had been some exceptions in history to this rule, as
illustrated by the powers possessed by the office of justice of the
peace in Great Britain. However, even though this was part of the
legal tradition, it was the exception rather than the rule insofar
as the exercise of judicial power was concerned. Star chamber
proceedings also had been employed, but contrary to the commonlaw heritage.
If one views the writings of legal scholars, and American Bar
Association committee reports and proposals from the beginning
of the century to the passage of the APA in 1946, a certain fear of
the administrative process becomes evident, as well as a tendency
to desire a measure of conformity between agency procedure and
traditional common-law court practice. Roscoe Pound, who spoke
throughout this period both as an independent scholar and as a
representative of American Bar Association committees dealing
with administrative law reform, stated as early as 1914 that there
was a conflict between what he termed "executive justice" and
"justice according to law.12 3 He recognized that administrative
law did not and probably could not fit comfortably into the common-law pattern, in terms of the personnel, issues, and procedures
involved. He favored as a minimum a strict code of administrative
procedure and extensive judicial review. 24 He did not feel that
the APA was adequate to meet the threat of administrative arbitrariness.
The first report of the American Bar Association Committee on
Administrative Law, established in 1933, echoed the concerns of
men like Pound in the statement that:
When ... the administrative official exercises a quasi-judicial
function, he may be expected to conform to the sort of procedure

which has been found best adapted to the determination of the
rights and obligations of the individual in his controversies with
other individuals and with the Government. Certain fundamental
safeguards of notice, opportunity for hearing, and determination

or review of issues of fact and of law by an independent tribunal

(and eventually, on questions of law at least, by a court) are in-

23

24

Pound, Justice According to Law, 14 CoLUm. L. REv. 1, 18 (1914). This
article is in three parts; the other parts are in 13 CoLum. L. REV. 696
(1913); 14 COLum. L.REV. 103 (1914).
See Pound, For the "Minority Report," 27 A.B.A.J. 664 (1941).
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volved, and,
indeed, are necessary if justice is to be done to the
25
individual.

The emphasis during this early period of legal concern with the
administrative process was upon the procedural rather than the
substantive aspects of administrative law. Although there was
not necessarily a quarrel with the nature of substantive policy
formulated by administrative agencies, there was a concern with
the way in which general rules were made as well as with their application in specific cases of adjudication. 2 6 After much maneuvering the American Bar Association secured the passage of the
Walter-Logan Bill in 1940, only to have it vetoed by President Roosevelt. This act was an extreme attempt to control administrative
procedure, and it is difficult to visualize how it could have worked.
For example, it provided that "administrative rules and all amendments or modifications or supplements of existing rules implementing or filling in the details of any statute affecting the rights of
persons or property shall be issued . . . only after publication of

notice and public hearings. ' 27 This would have introduced a novel
feature in the law by providing for hearings with respect to the
formulation of legislation-a concept rejected by the courts then
and now. With respect to administrative adjudication, the act
established strict requirements for formal hearings and provided
that "any person aggrieved by an agency decision" had a right to
such a hearing. Finally, judicial review of administrative decisions
25

Report of the Special Committee on Administrative Law, 58 A.B.A.
REP. 407, 410 (1933).
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Of course there are some members of the American Bar Association
who essentially opposed the New Deal and the increased scope of governmental activity through an expanded administrative branch. Their
concern with administrative procedure was based not only upon the
need to protect the rights of the individual, but also upon the necessity
of curbing administrative expansion. One way of shaping the substantive nature of policy formed by administrative agencies is to give

to those directly or indirectly affected the ability to participate in the
process of policy formulation. If this could be done effectively it
would result in a limitation upon the scope of governmental activity.
As a minimum it would delay administrative action, which would be
in the interests of those opposed to particular political programs that
can only be implemented through such action. Thus, to some extent
the more extreme proposals for control of administrative procedure resulted from an essential opposition to the administrative process and
27

the New Deal itself.
Section 2 (a). The texts of both the Walter-Logan Bill, H.R. 6324, 76th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1939) and the American Bar Association Administra-

tive Law Bill, H.R. 4236, 76th Cong., 1st Sess (1939), which was essentially the same, may be found in Hearings on H.R. 6324 and H.R. 4236
Before the House Subcommittee No. 4 of the Committee on the Judiciary, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-5, 10-14 (1939).
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was established both with respect to points of law and fact, a concept that overruled the carefully formulated plans of the judiciary
2
to limit the scope of review to legal issues. 8
During the same year that the Walter-Logan Bill was passed
by Congress, Justice Frankfurter, speaking for the Supreme Court,
stated in Railroad Comm'n v. Rowan & Nichols Oil Co., with respect to the validity of an oil proration order promulgated by the
Texas Railroad Commission which had been challenged as a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment: "A controversy like this always calls for fresh reminder that courts must not substitute their
notions of expediency and fairness for those which have guided
the agencies to whom the formulation and execution of policy
have been entrusted.13 0 Further, he noted that "it is not for the
federal courts to supplant the Commission's judgment even in the
face of convincing proof that a different result would have been
better." 3 ' This case is representative of the trend in the judiciary,
which began during the thirties, to defer to the expert judgment of
administrative agencies. In this respect the legislative proposals of
the American Bar Association to expand judicial review were in
conflict with case law developed by the courts. The latter had
a greater realization of what it would mean to remove the barriers
to judicial review that they had so carefully constructed. In this
sense the judiciary was more practical because of its greater day
to day involvement in the reviewing process.
President Roosevelt summed up the point of view of many
scholars and practitioners of administrative law concerning the
Walter-Logan Bill in his veto message. He noted:
I am convinced ... that in reality the effect of this bill would
be to reverse and, to a large extent, cancel one of the most significant and useful trends of the twentieth century in legal administration.
That movement has its origin in the recognition even by the
courts themselves that the conventional processes of the courts are
not adapted to handling controversies in the mass. Court procedure is adapted to the intensive investigation of individual con28

In the face of the growing volume of administrative decisions it was
necessary for the courts to develop doctrines of self-restraint to avoid
a deluge of appeals from agency determinations; hence they formulated
what one scholar has termed "the doctrine of judicial inexpertise."
See Roche, Judicial Self-Restraint, 49 Am. POL. ScI. REV. 762, 769

(1955).
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310 U.S. 573 (1940). These parties came before the Court again in
1941. See Railroad Comm'n v. Rowan & Nichols Oil Co., 311 U.S. 570
(1941) in which Mr. Justice Frankfurter affirmed his earlier conclusions.
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310 U.S. at 580.

31 Id. at 584.
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troversies. But it is impossible to subject the daily routine of factfinding in many of our agencies to court procedure. Litigation
has become costly beyond the ability of the average person to
bear. Its technical rules of procedure are often traps for the unwary and technical rules of evidence often prevent common-sense
determinations on information which would be regarded as adequate for any business decision....
The administrative tribunal or agency has been evolved in
order to handle controversies arising under particular statutes.
It is characteristic of these tribunals that simple and nontechnical
proceedings
hearings take the place of court trials, and informal
32
supersede rigid and formal pleadings and processes.

Because of the intense interest in and importance of administrative
law during the latter part of the thirties, Roosevelt directed the
Attorney General to select a committee to investigate the nature
of the administrative process and make recommendations for necessary improvements. The committee submitted its report in 1941,
with the majority recommending rather flexible and lenient conThe mitrols of administrative rule-making and adjudication."
nority recommended very strict control of these areas of administration, in a manner similar to the Walter-Logan Bill. After the
interruption of World War II the American Bar Association again
came strongly to the fore and secured the passage of the APA which
in terms of content fell between the more liberal bill that had been
recommended by the majority of the Attorney General's Committee
in terms
in 1941, and the strict bill of the minority. It was 3 closer
4
of spirit and content to the latter than the former.
A.

THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT OF 1946

Because the APA is the only general statute that governs administrative procedure today it is important to review briefly its
salient features. First, the act recognizes the exigencies of the
administrative process and does not attempt, as did its predecessor,
the Walter-Logan Bill, to force agency procedure into a single judicial mold. It takes into account the fact that each agency has
some unique characteristics and problems which are governed by
statute; hence, the APA does not require specified procedure in
rule-making and adjudication unless a previous statutory requirement for hearing exists. Further, large portions of the adminis32

86

CONG. REC.

13942 (1940).

33 REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON ADMINIsTRATIvE PROCEDURE APPOINTED BY
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE IN GOVERNMENT
AGENCIES, S. Doc. No. 8, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. (1941).
34

For an excellent discussion of the background and content of the APA
see Sherwood, The Federal Administrative Procedure Act, 41 AM. POL.
ScI. REV. 271 (1947).
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trative process are exempt from the provisions of the APA.3 5 There
are general requirements pertaining to the right to counsel, administrative subpoenas, denial of applications (prompt notice must
be given and the grounds for denial stated by the agency), and
license cases. Although these provisions also contain various limitations upon their applicability, they apply regardless of previous
statutory provisions to the contrary. 36
With respect to judicial review, the APA establishes two important limitations. First, if there is a statutory preclusion of review, the APA's provisions for review cannot be invoked. Second,
agency action committed by law to agency discretion cannot be
reviewed. 37 Although these limitations may seem relatively clear
at first glance, the fact is that they result in extremely difficult
questions of interpretation. For example, in order to preclude
judicial review must a statute have an express provision to this
effect? The courts do not support this view, and, in fact, in some
instances they find congressional intent to preclude judicial review
because of the absence of an affirmative provision for review. Similarly, the question of whether or not a matter is committed to
agency discretion by law requires as a general rule judicial interpretation of legislative intent. If it is determined that the provisions of the APA with regard to judicial review apply, then the
effect of the act is to expand the scope of review by providing that
in making their determinations concerning the legality of administrative action the courts must review the whole record. In other
words it is not enough for the courts simply to uphold the agency's
decision because they find adequate evidence to support it; both
pros and cons must be considered, and judicial decision must rest
upon a comparison of the validity of the contentions of each side.
Theoretically this should limit the presumption of validity that the
courts have in the past accorded to administrative decisions; in
fact, although a number of cases reviewed since the passage of the
APA undoubtedly have been decided against the agencies concerned as a result of this expanded scope of review, there still
exists a strong judicial deference to administrative expertise.
Aside from expanding the scope of judicial review, the APA's
more positive features include: (1) requirements for public information about agency policies and practices; 38 and (2) the establishment of an independent class of hearing examiners, in con35 APA §§ 2, 3, 4, 5.
36 APA §§ 6, 9.
37
38

APA § 10.
APA § 3.
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junction with a separation of the prosecutory and adjudicative functions within each agency. 39 With respect to the former, agencies
have given greater publicity, both in the Federal Register (and
hence the Code of Federal Regulations) and separately, to their procedural and substantive rules. Insofar as the latter is concerned,
one of the most important changes in the administrative process
as a result of the APA is the greater independence of hearing examiners. The agencies are unable to influence examiners on the
basis of particular policy points of view as easily as they did before
the APA, and those who deal with regulatory agencies today feel
to a greater degree that trial examiners can give them a genuinely
independent decision.
However, problems have developed concerning the independence of hearing examiners. First, the very fact that trial examiners
are more independent than in the past means there is a greater
disparity between their decisions and the policy viewpoints of the
top agency officials. Of course there are many cases in which the
examiner's decision becomes final because of lack of agency review.
This depends upon the agency and the type of case involved.40 Louis
J. Hector, a former member of the Civil Aeronautics Board, recently remarked that:
The hearing examiner who heard the Seven States case did
not know what the Board had in mind in terms of extent of
service.
The Board had in its own thinking come around to the conclusion that any town which had any reasonable chance of producing 5 passengers a day should have a chance to see if it could
do so, and if it could then it should have an airline.
The hearing examiner did not know this, because he is independent, and the Board could not talk to him.
So he spent 2 years hearing evidence and turning out a 500odd page opinion.
It came up to the Board, and the Board's first reaction was,
"This wasn't what we had in mind at '41
all. We were thinking of
a much more extensive route pattern."
This illustrates that the separation of those engaged in the formulation of agency policy from those initially adjudicating cases may
directly cause nullification of the initial decision; hence, the in39 APA §§ 5, 11.
40 Statistics with respect to the finality of examiners' decisions in accord-

ance with the type of case handled in various agencies may be found in
1959
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REPORT
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PROCEDURE

38-46.
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Hearings pursuantto S. Res. 234 Before the Subcommittee on Adminis-

trative Practice and Procedure of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 232 (1960).
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dependence of the trial examiner will be to no avail. Aside from
this problem, a second point that should be noted concerning the
limitation of trial examiner independence is, once again, that large
portions of the administrative process are excluded from these APA
provisions.
B.

SUMMARY

The accelerated expansion of administrative agencies during
the New Deal and the recognition that the administrative process
was deeply involved in the exercise of judicial functions resulted
in American Bar Association proposals for judicialization of administrative procedure. The Walter-Logan Bill, which passed both
houses of Congress in 1940 only to be vetoed by President Roosevelt, was an attempt to mold all administrative agencies in the
image of the judicial process. In 1946, with the passage of the APA,
the American Bar Association was finally successful; however, the
APA recognizes the exigencies of administrative procedure as well
as diversity within the administrative branch. As a result, its provisions for standardization of administrative procedure in rulemaking and adjudication do not apply across the board to all administrative agencies; statutory provisions as a general rule are
superior to the APA, and Congress may either exclude an agency
completely from the provisions of the act, or it may provide for
elimination of hearings in certain categories of cases or a limitation
upon judicial review-which will result in only partial application
of the APA to the agency's operation. Congress may also exempt
agencies from particular APA provisions.
The rather equivocal nature of the APA, and the resulting
exemption of large portions of the administrative process from its
provisions, has resulted in dissatisfaction on the part of the American Bar Association relative to present administrative practices. At
the same time there are a number of agency officials, administrators, and scholars of administration generally who are dissatisfied
with the nature of administrative law today. All of these groups
have recommended changes in recent years, and it is now necessary to examine the nature and the validity of current proposals
for reform of administrative procedure in light of the nature of
administrative law discussed previously.
III.

A.

CURRENT PROPOSALS FOR ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

REFORM

One may roughly divide current proposals for reform of administrative procedure into those representing the formal stand
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of the American Bar Association, and those emanating from Congress. The latter represent a synthesis of the views of many groups.
There is no unified reform movement, although there is widespread
dissatisfaction representing divergent points of view. Each group
that puts forth reform proposals views the administrative process
from a different perspective, and, because of diverse premises, different requirements for administrative procedure are emphasized.
In order to understand the administrative reform movement it is
necessary to indicate briefly the positions that have been taken by
the major groups involved.
B.

THE

STAND OF THE AMERICAN BAR AssOCIATION

The American Bar Association's position in 1962 with respect to
the administrative process is virtually identical to its posture of
the thirties. Because of its dissatisfaction with the results of the
APA of 1946, the American Bar Association is recommending reforms that would lead to greater judicialization of administrative
procedure than presently exists. In brief form the American Bar
Association is recommending:
(1) stricter separation of judicial
functions from legislative and executive functions within the administrative process; and (2) the establishment, within the judicial
area of administration, of well-defined procedures which conform
to traditional judicial procedures insofar as possible. The assumptions underlying these recommendations are: (1) judicial functions
can be clearly distinguished when exercised by administrative agencies; (2) the rights of the individual directly involved in adjudication must be protected; and (3) the best way to do this is through
formal judicial procedure.
In order to accomplish its objectives the American Bar Association is proposing both a stricter Code of Federal Administrative Procedure, and the establishment of specialized administrative
courts in the trade practice and labor relations fields. In line with
the latter proposals the American Bar Association has recom42
mended that the Tax Court be transferred to the judicial branch.
Although these proposals are relatively stringent in terms of the
effect they would have upon administrative procedure, they are
not as strict as the recommendations of the Hoover Commission
Task Force upon which they were based. The American Bar Association, however, seems to agree with the basic assumptions of the
Task Force, which were stated in the following way: (1) "The more
closely that administrative procedures can be made to conform to
judicial procedures, the greater the probability that justice will be
42 For all of these proposals, see Report of Special Committee on Legal
Services and Procedure, 81 A.B.A. REP. 491 (1956).
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attained in the administrative process;" and (2) "formalization of
administrative procedures along judicial lines is consistent with
efficiency and simplification of the administrative process." 43 The
Task Force recommended legislation similar to that being sponsored by the American Bar Association at the present time, viz., a
strict code of administrative procedure, administrative courts, and
the transference of certain judicial functions "such as the imposition of money penalties, the remission or compromise of money
penalties, the award of reparations or damages, and the issuance
of injunctive orders, ' 44 to the common-law courts. Although legislation has been introduced to effect proposals for the limited establishment of administrative courts, recently this idea has been
given less serious attention, and concentration has been placed
upon proposals for stricter legislative control of internal agency
procedure and an expansion of judicial review.

C. Tim

CODE OF FEDERAL ADmVnsTRATivE PROCEDURE

In what way does the proposed new Code of Federal Administrative Procedure change the APA and current administrative practice? No precise answer can be given to this question, for administrative procedure is dependent upon a number of variables.
One can make any number of technical changes in legislation; however, there must be either voluntary acceptance of proposed changes
on the part of those affected, or an adequate enforcement agency.
At the time the APA was passed many felt that the administrative
process would be forced into a judicial mold, and that administrative procedure would be very significantly altered. Time, however,
produced a different result. As indicated previously, the trend
in judicial review during the latter part of the thirties and the
forties was not in line with proposals for stricter control of administrative rule-making and adjudication. Hence, when the APA
finally became law, it was only natural that the courts would
adopt, in many instances, a liberal interpretation of its provisions
that would leave untouched large areas of administrative discretion. The APA, of course, had a definite impact upon the administrative process that has been discussed above, even though it did
not fulfill the expectations of its framers. However, experience
with the APA indicates that one must be extremely careful in
attempting to ascertain the possible effects of statutes governing
administrative procedure.
43 U.S. COMMISSION ON ORGANIZATION Or THE EXECUTiVE BRANCH OF THE
GOVERNMVENT (1953-55), TASK FORCE REPORT ON LEGAL SERVICES AND

PROCEDURE 138 (1955).
44

Id. at 85.
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D.

ELIMINATION

OF STATUTORY EXEMPTIONS

The Code of Federal Administrative Procedure contains a
number of important changes from the provisions of the APA.
First, it eliminates the large number of specific statutory exemptions from the APA. Section 1012 of the Code lists no less than
seventeen laws with APA exemptions, and repeals the sections of
those laws providing for such exemption. Further, the Code provides in section 1012 that, in addition to these seventeen laws specifically mentioned: "[A] II laws or parts of law . . . which, either
expressly or impliedly, grant exemption from the provisions of the
Administrative Procedure Act of 1946 are hereby repealed. .. "
Such important laws as the Immigration and Nationality Act of
1952, the Universal Military Training and Service Act, and the
Atomic Energy Act of 1954 would be changed to provide for procedures in accord with the Code. This elimination of exemptions
from the Code applies, of course, to the entire Code, and would include rule-making and adjudicative procedures, as well as all other
areas governed by the Code.
E.

THE

CODE AND ADMINISTRATIVE RULE-MAKING

The American Bar Association's Code of Federal Administrative Procedure stiffens procedural requirements for rule-making,
and is aimed at securing greater judicialization in the area of administrative adjudication. 45 A careful reading of section 1003 of
the proposed Code, which governs rule-making, reveals that it is
less permissive in allowing administrative agencies exemption from
its provisions than is section 4 of the APA. The Code eliminates
notice and public participation requirements in rule-making:
(1)
required to be kept secret in the protection of the national security, (2) relating to public property, loans, grants,
benefits, or contracts to the extent that the agency finds and
publishes, with a statement of supporting reasons, that such public participation would occasion delay or expense disproportionate
to the public interest; or (3) relating solely to internal manage46
ment or personnel of the agency.
45 The original resolution proposing the Code of Federal Administrative
Procedure may be found in Report of the Special Committee on Legal
Services and Procedure, 81 A.B.A. REP. 491 (1956).
It became S. 1070,
86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1960), and S. 1887, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961).
See also Fuchs, The Proposed New Code of Administrative Procedure,
19 OHIo ST. L.J. 423 (1958); Fuchs, The American Bar Association
and The Hoover Task Force Administrative Code Proposals, 23 I.C.C.
PRAc. J. 870 (1956).

46 The text of this and subsequently cited sections of the Code of Federal
Administrative Procedure is taken from S. 1887, 87th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1961).
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The APA provides for similar exemptions in section 4 and adds
that, except where notice or hearing is required by statute in rulemaking, its notice and public participation provisions "shall not
apply to interpretative rules, general statements of policy, rules of
agency organization, procedure, or practice, or in any situation in
which the agency for good cause finds (and incorporates the finding
and a brief statement of the reasons therefor in the rules issued)
that notice and public procedure thereon are impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest." (Emphasis added.)
This is clearly more permissive than the proposed Code, and gives
virtually complete discretion to the agencies in rule-making proceedings to determine appropriate procedure. Further, the Code
provides in section 1003 (b), as does the APA in section 4 (b), that
agencies shall afford interested persons an opportunity to participate in rule-making through the submission of written data, etc.,
and oral presentation unless the agency considers it unnecessary.
However, the Code adds that "the agency shall fully consider all
submissions," and "except with regard to rules of procedure, the
agency shall, when requested by an interested person, issue a concise statement of the matters considered in adopting or rejecting
the rule and the reasons therefor." These latter provisions are not
in the APA.

F. THE

CODE AND ADMINISTRATIVE ADJUDICATION

The greatest changes proposed in the Code of Federal Administrative Procedure pertain to administrative adjudication and judicial review. In these areas the APA was relatively lenient, providing generally for a separation of functions, an independent class
of hearing examiners whose opinions could readily be overruled by
the agency, the right to counsel, proper notice before a hearing, as
well as notice of adverse agency action in certain types of cases.
Finally, judicial review was expanded, as indicated above, to include
the whole record. Undoubtedly one of the major limitations upon
the effectiveness of these APA provisions is the large number of
exemptions to the act, established by its own terms and by the provision that previous or future statutory requirements supersede
APA mandates. This fact, combined with permissive judicial interpretation of the act, renders it relatively ineffective in the control
of administrative procedure. This has been discussed above.
The Code contains an important section controlling informal
adjudication. In this area the APA is only incidentally relevant.
Section 1004 (b) of the Code provides that in all cases of informal
adjudication that affect private rights, claims, or privileges:
[D]ecisions of subordinate officers may by rule be made
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subject to review within the agency by the agency or designated

boards or superior officers. If requested, the reviewing authority
shall furnish to a party a statement of the reasons for its decision.
The decision of the reviewing authority or, if the agency fails to
establish an intra-agency review procedure, the decision of the
subordinate officer shall . . . constitute agency action subject to
shall be made
judicial review, in which case the
4 7 record on review
by trial in the reviewing court.
In some respects this is a revolutionary change, substantially altering judicial doctrine as well as statutory prescription. The courts
have generally required exhaustion of administrative remedy which
usually involves case disposition at the formal stage of adjudication. It is difficult to see how such an expansion of judicial review
could work, given the volume of cases settled informally. 48 The
courts are already overburdened and scarcely capable of providing meaningful review of formal administrative cases, let alone informal cases.
In the area of formal adjudication the requirements of the
Code, like those of the APA, would not apply except where hearings are required by statute or by the constitution. Once a hearing is required, the Code is far stricter than the APA in its procedural restrictions. It is safe to say that the framers of the Code
had as their primary consideration the protection of the rights of
the individual in the administrative process. In the formal hearing
stage the Code spells out in greater detail than the APA the separation of the prosecutory and adjudicative functions within agencies. In this respect the Code attempts, on the one hand, to isolate
hearing examiners vis-d-vis the parties in particular cases, and on
the other to give examiners more authority in relation to agency
review of their decisions. In this area it is with regard to agency
review of an examiner's decision that the Code differs most from
the APA. The APA provides, as does the Code, that the officer
who presides at the initial hearing shall render a decision which
becomes the decision of the agency in the absence of an appeal. If
an appeal from the examiner's decision is taken to the agency, the
APA provides that "the agency shall, except as it may limit the
issues upon notice or by rule, have all the powers which it would
have in making the initial decision. ' 49 For this reason it has been
common practice for agencies to overrule their own examiners, and
there are few risks taken when this is done, although the courts
have in some instances insisted that agencies substantiate in evi47
48

Emphasis added.
See Woll, Informal Administrative Adjudication: Summary of Findings,
7 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 436 (1960).

49 APA

§ 8(a).
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dence the reversal of an examiner's decision.50 On the other hand,
under the provisions of the Code 51 the agencies would be given
far less discretion to overrule trial examiners. The Code requires
that upon review the agency must confine itself to the record established by the presiding officer, and adds the mandate that "no
other material shall be considered by the agency upon review."
Further, the Code provides that "the grounds of the decision shall
be within the scope of the issues presented on the record. The findings of evidentiary fact, as distinguished from ultimate conclusions
of fact, made by the presiding officer shall not be set aside by the
agency on review of the presiding officer's initial decisions unless
such findings of evidentiary fact are contrary to the weight of the
evidence. '5 2 It is not possible to say precisely how this provision
would work because of the difficulty of defining "evidentiary fact."
However, there is little doubt that the role of the agencies as opposed to that of the presiding officers in formal hearings would be
more limited than is presently the case. Further, this section of
the Code would give additional ammunition to the courts that
could be used to justify reversal of an agency decision which did
not follow that of the examiner.
The essential problem raised by the Code's stricter separation of
the presiding officers from the agency heads, as has been noted
above with respect to present APA provisions, 53 is that it would
increase the isolation of the trial examiner vis-d-vis the agency.
This would lead to greater disparity between the policy viewpoints
of the agency and the examiner; at the same time it would give the
agency less power to overrule the examiner and thus implement
its policy position. In other words, the Code emphasizes the importance of adjudication at the expense of policy, and tends to reinforce agency-examiner conflict. The very fact that agencies
today feel compelled to reverse the findings of their examiners so
frequently reflects this problem. Of course, the answer that proponents of the Code would give to this statement is that the rights
of individuals are more important than the policy considerations
of administrative agencies. However, as has been noted previously,
the substantive element of administrative law cannot be overlooked
when attempting to construct a system of administrative justice.
50

See FCC v. Allentown Broadcasting Corp., 349 U.S. 358 (1955), revers-

ing, Allentown Broadcasting Corp. v. FCC, 222 F.2d 781 (D.C. Cir. 1954);
Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951). Note also
discussion in text at notes 40-41 supra.
51 Proposed Code of Federal Administrative Procedure § 1007(c).
52 Ibid.
53 See text discussion at notes 40-41 supra.
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The needs of the agencies must be balanced with the rights of the
individual. Although supporters of the Code would say they have
done this, it is suggested here that they have concentrated primarily
upon securing individual rights and have given less attention to
requirements of public policy formulation in the public interest.

G. THE CODE AND JUDICIAL REVIEW
In the area of judicial review the proposed Code of Federal Administrative Procedure has vastly expanded the ability of indivividuals to secure a redress of grievances in the courts. The APA,
although it expanded the scope of judicial review by providing for
review of the whole record of agency proceedings, nevertheless
made its judicial review provisions applicable "except so far as (1)
statutes preclude judicial review, or (2) agency action is by law
committed to agency discretion. '54 As noted above, the courts
have seized upon this statement to preclude review in many instances, even though statutory intent to provide or withdraw judicial review is unclear. 55
The Code contains no such exemption from its requirements
for judicial review. In fact it states affirmatively that unless there
is an express statutory preclusion of review it will be available to
anyone aggrieved by agency action. 56 The Code also contains more
individual-oriented provisions for standing to secure review than
does the APA. The latter states that "any person suffering legal
wrong because of any agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by such action within the meaning of any relevant statute,
shall be entitled to judicial review thereof. '57 The Code provides
that "any person adversely affected or aggrieved by any such reviewable agency action shall have standing to seek judicial review
thereof, except where expressly precluded by Act of Congress
hereafter enacted." 58 In conjunction with this standing provision
the Code makes every final agency action subject to judicial review
59
In
unless expressly precluded therefrom by an act of Congress.
parties
of
range
a
broader
to
standing
gives
Code
the
technical terms
than the APA. Further, instead of stating merely that the whole
record of the agency proceeding shall be reviewed by the court
54 APA § 10.
55 See, e.g., Schilling v. Rogers, 363 U.S. 666 (1960).
56 Proposed Code of Federal Administrative Procedure § 1009(a).
57 APA § 10(a).
58 Proposed Code of Federal Administrative Procedure § 1009(b).

59 Proposed Code of Federal Administrative Procedure § 1009(a).
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upon judicial review, the Code spells out in detail that the record
on review of formal administrative cases shall include:
(1) all matters constituting the record for action or review
by the agency, including the original or certified copies of all
papers presented to or considered by the agency, (2) rulings
upon exceptions, (3) the decision, findings, and action of the
agency, and (4) as to alleged procedural errors and irregularities
not appearing in the agency record, evidence taken independently
by the court.60
Apart from review of formal cases, the Code provides that "in all
other cases, the record on review shall be made by trial in the reviewing court." 61 This latter provision leads to a final consideration, noted above, namely that informal adjudicative determinations are subject to judicial review, whereupon the record is to be
62
made in the reviewing court.
Aside from expanding judicial review through elimination of
exemptions, broadening scope, and facilitating standing, the Code
contains several novel features giving the courts greater power
over the agencies. In particular, the courts may intervene in
agency proceedings under defined circumstances before the agency
has rendered a final decision. This substantially modifies the
long-standing criterion of exhaustion of administrative remedies
which, until now, has applied in most cases before judicial review
may be obtained. In this regard, the Code provides that "upon
a showing of irreparable injury, any Federal court of competent
jurisdiction may enjoin at any time the conduct of any agency proceeding in which the proceeding itself or the action proposed to be
taken therein is clearly beyond the constitutional or statutory jurisdiction or authority of the agency." 63 Further, the Code requires
that "every agency shall proceed with reasonable dispatch to conclude any matter presented to it with due regard for the convenience of the parties or their representatives, giving precedence to
rehearing proceedings after remand by court order."64 A party
may, on the basis of undue delay in the proceedings, appeal to the
federal court for relief, and the court "may direct the agency to
decide the matter promptly" if it finds such delay present.65 It is
evident here as elsewhere in the Code that the American Bar Association intends to expand the role of the courts in administrative
proceedings.
60 Proposed
61 Ibid.
62 Proposed
63 Proposed
64 Proposed
65 Ibid.

Code of Federal Administrative Procedure § 1009(e).
Code of Federal Administrative Procedure § 1004(b).
Code of Federal Administrative Procedure § 1009(g).
Code of Federal Administrative Procedure § 1005(d).
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H. SUIMiARY OF THE CODE

The proposed Code of Federal Administrative Procedure is
the most comprehensive and important proposal of the American
Bar Association governing administrative procedure at the present time. It would completely replace the APA, and would provide greater procedural restrictions upon administrative agencies.
Most importantly, the Code attempts to eliminate most of the statutory exemptions to the APA, and vastly expands the role of the
judiciary in the review of administrative decisions. The Code
requires internal agency procedure to conform more closely to
accepted judicial norms. Proper notice, hearings, and a record
are to comprise as many agency proceedings as possible. Rules
of evidence and requirements of proof "shall conform, to the extent practicable, with those in civil nonjury cases in the United
States district courts."6 6 Personal decision-making is emphasized
over institutional decision processes through giving trial examiners
greater authority and reducing the discretion of agencies in the
review of the decisions of presiding officers. The judicial decisionmaking model was employed by the framers of the Code, and they
are less willing to leave procedural matters within the discretion
of the agencies than was the case with those who formulated the
APA. The Code, which has been discussed extensively in Senate
hearings, is now being seriously considered for the first time in
hearings before the House Judiciary Committee. In January 1962,
introduced in the
Congressmtn Francis E. Walter of Pennsylvania
67
House legislation based on the Code.
I.

CURRENT CONGREsSIONAL ATTITUDES AND PROPOSALS FOR PROCEDURAL REFORM

Apart from considerations concerning the Code, Congress has
been deeply involved in recent years in a general attempt to assess
requirements for administrative procedure. The 1955 Hoover Commission Task Force Report on Legal Services and Procedure and

the subsequent American Bar Association proposals stirred Congress to renew its investigation of the administrative process. In
addition to this, the revelations of the Harris Special Subcommittee
on Legislative Oversight caused congressional concern in various
areas, but particularly with respect to ex parte influence on administrative decisions of a judicial nature. Much of the current legislation seriously proposed by House and Senate committees dealing
with administrative procedures contains provisions to increase and
66 Proposed Code of Federal Administrative Procedure § 1006(d).
67 H.R. 9926, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962).
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ensure the independence of administrators involved directly in
making judicial decisions. The scope of pending legislation in

Congress that has committee support is not nearly as broad as the
Code of Federal Administrative Procedure. It is possible that the
House Judiciary Committee will recommend passage of the Code
in 1962. However, at the present time, the Code does not have

significant congressional backing.
The Harris Special Subcommittee on Legislative Oversight held

numerous hearings from 1958 to 1960 concerning the conduct of proceedings before the regulatory agencies.68 As a result of these
hearings new legislation to control ex parte representations in
judicial proceedings was recommended, directed specifically at the
six agencies (CAB, FCC, FPC, FTC, ICC, and SEC) which the com-

mittee had investigated. An example of the approach of the Harris
committee (now the Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee)
may be seen in the proposed Independent Regulatory Agencies Act
of 196169 which attempted to define and control improper influence

upon and by agency members and employees.
Separate sections of this act deal with the problem of ex parte
communications, prohibiting such communication from outside
parties, and providing for a record of ex parte contacts made by
agency members, hearing officers, or employees. The act generally
is an attempt to protect "on-the-record," i.e., formal, proceedings.
This fact, in addition to the limitation of the applicability of the
act to the six agencies noted above, makes it extremely narrow in
scope. The 1961 Independent Regulatory Agencies Act represents
a watered-down version of the bill originally introduced and considered by the Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee of the
House in 1959 and 1960.70 Both the original and current versions
of the act have caused strong agency opposition, and it is doubtful
that effective legislation of this nature will be passed in the near
future.
The counterpart in the Senate to the Harris committee is the
Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and Procedure of the
Judiciary Committee. John A. Carroll of Colorado is the present
68 Hearings on Investigation of Regulatory Commissions and Agencies
Before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958); 86th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1959). Hearings on Major Administrative Process Problems Before a

Subcommittee of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959).
69 H.R. 14, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961).
70 H.R. 4800, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959). See also Hearings on Independent Regulatory Agencies Legislation Before the House Committee on
Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (1960).
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chairman. After holding extensive hearings in 1959 and 1960 on
procedural problems in administrative agencies 7 1 the committee
issued a report in 1961 which recommended that various changes
be made in legislation governing administrative procedure.7 2 The
Committee recommended against enactment of the Code of Federal
Administrative Procedure, stating that it would add undue formality to administrative proceedings. The committee noted that:
[T]here is little in the way of concrete evidence pointing to
any need for increased formalities, or for more active participation by the courts in the administrative process. On the other
hand, the subcommittee has received comments from thirty-three
agencies which almost unanimously expressed the fear that the
proposed code would increase their difficulties in disposing of
the business before them, with little or no increase in fairness of
procedure or quality of decision. The study and thoughtfulness
by the 32 agencies that came to the conclusion shared by this
subcommittee reinforces

that conclusion, namely,

that drastic

tinkering with the Administrative Procedure Act is undesirable
at this time.7 3
Having rejected "drastic" changes in the APA, the Carroll committee proposed certain amendments which would have the effect
of increasing the power of hearing examiners relative to agency
members in cases where the former preside at the initial proceeding.7 4

In a rather interesting twist, Robert Benjamin, who was in-

strumental in formulating the American Bar Association's Code,
rejected this provision in testimony before the committee on the
ground that it was too strict! The provision at issue states that the
agency may grant or take review of a case decided initially by an
examiner:
...
but only upon one or more of the following grounds:
(1) a finding of material fact is clearly erroneous, (2) a necessary legal conclusion is without governing precedent or is a departure from or contrary to established law, agency rules or
precedents, (3) a substantial and important question of administrative policy or discretion has been raised, or (4) the conduct of

the proceedings involved a prejudicial procedural error. 75
71

Hearings on Administrative Procedure Legislation Before the Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and Procedure of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959); Hearings on Federal Administrative Procedure Before the Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and Procedure of the Senate Committee on the Judi-

72

Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and Procedure of the Senate
Committee on the Judiciary, Administrative Practice and Procedure,
S. REP. No. 168, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961).
Id. at 10-11.

ciary, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (1960).

73
74
75

S. 1734,
S. 1734,

87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961).
§ 8(a), 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961).
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This provision grants agencies less discretion in the review of examiners' decisions than the corresponding Code requirements,
which are, as noted previously, very strict in this respect also.7 6
The recommendation for the enactment of S. 1734, and the committee proposal calling for legislation to facilitate judicial review of
agency decisions, are somewhat inconsistent with the general committee stand noted
above against increased formality in the administrative process. 77
J. THE LANDis REPORT ON REGULATORY AGENCIES
James Landis, whom President Kennedy requested to investigate the regulatory agencies immediately after his election in the
fall of 1960, joined the Carroll committee to question witnesses during part of its hearings on administrative procedure. The Landis
Report on Regulatory Agencies to the President-elect was reprinted
at the committee's request.7 8 In several respects there is general
agreement between the 1961 recommendations of the Carroll committee and the Landis proposals. 79 The Landis report dealt with
the problems of regulatory agencies in terms of top management
and major cases, and it was primarily concerned with policymaking. No particular attempt was made to separate and emphasize the distinctions between legislative and adjudicative functions
in administrative law. At the beginning of the report the major
problems of regulatory agencies are related in terms of: (1) delays
in the disposition of adjudicative proceedings; (2) excessive costs
of administrative proceedings generally; (3) lack of high caliber
personnel; (4) prevalence of unethical conduct, particularly in
terms of ex parte representation; (5) inefficient procedure, particularly as a result of excessive "judicialization;" (6) inadequate
organizational structures, causing a lack of unified policy direction
within and between agencies; and (7) lack of effective presidential

control over major regulatory policies.
Various remedies were proposed by Landis to cope with these
problems. Generally, he recommended presidential appointment
of chairmen, where this power does not exist, to provide greater

over-all coordination of regulatory policy. The President would
be aided in this task by the establishment of a special office to deal
76

77

See text discussion at notes 48-52 supra.
For the proposal regarding judicial review, see Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and Procedure of the Senate Committee on the

Judiciary, Administrative Practice and Procedure, S. REP. No. 168, at
12, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961).
78 See note 4 supra.
79 The Carroll committee report is cited at note 72 supra.
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with such agencies within the Executive Office of the President.
Internal efficiency of the agencies would be strengthened through
an increase in the power of the chairmen, and through greater
delegation of formal adjudicative functions to hearing examiners
to eliminate the necessity of agency review. In this way more unified direction would be given to the agencies, and the top echelon
would have greater time to devote to policy formulation. Landis
recommended greater emphasis upon informal techniques within
the formal stage of adjudication, i.e., by hearing examiners. Further, he admired the success of informal adjudication in such agencies as the NLRB; however, he did not note in particular the vast
use of this method of case disposition throughout the administrative process. He hinted that perhaps administrative procedure
was too judicialized. Finally, he proposed measures to obtain highcaliber personnel, e.g., longer terms of office, more prestige to the
chairmen of agencies, etc. The Carroll committee agreed with the
Landis report in recommending: (1) an office in the White House to
coordinate various activities relating to the regulatory agencies, e.g.,
reorganization plans, statistical compilation, investigation of trouble
spots; (2) legislation to increase the term of agency members to ten
years, increase their salary and other benefits; and (3) legislation to
increase the prestige and power of hearing examiners. Both Landis
and the Carroll committee also agreed that a permanent Administrative Procedure Conference and secretariat should be established
to continue the present Administrative Conference.
Many of Landis' proposals were incorporated into legislative
bills in 1961 with the support of President Kennedy. However, the
bulk were turned down by Congress because of agency and outside
interest opposition. In some respects the chairmen of certain
agencies, such as the CAB and FTC, have greater power today than
previously because of a 1961 reorganization approval by Congress;
and the President may reorganize the structure of agencies providing Congress does not veto. However, the agencies generally remain
the same today, both with respect to procedure and structure, as
they were before the current reform proposals were made.
K.

Sumnv ARy

The major seriously considered proposals for reform of administrative procedure in 1962 emanate from the American Bar Association and from committees in the House and Senate that have held
extensive investigations of the administrative process during the
past few years. Because the views of various outside groups, in
addition to those of the American Bar Association, have been felt by
Congress, the proposals coming from congressional committees are
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less extensive in attempting to control administrative procedure,
and not as strictly in accord with the judicial model as those stemming from the American Bar Association. Of course, the most
important opposition to change in administrative procedure comes

from the agencies themselves. This has been revealed in testimony
before committees of Congress. Congressman Francis E. Walter of

Pennsylvania has recently introduced a bill in the House that would
affect the provisions of the Code of Federal Administrative Procedure proposed by the American Bar Association. The House
Judiciary Committee plans to hold extensive hearings on the Code
and other proposals for procedural reform. In other words, in addition to the fact that the Code and other proposals were considered
in extensive hearings held since 1958, the Code is of particular

current interest and concern and is still under intensive investigation. The Code has been examined in detail above in relation to
the APA, and the more important changes that would be effected
through its enactment, as well as their implications, have been
covered. It is now necessary, in conclusion, to note some of the
more important considerations involved in administrative law in
relation to current -proposals for procedural change.

IV. CONCLUSION: THE PROBLEM OF
ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE
In view of the nature and source of the reform movement directed toward improvement of administrative procedure today,

the fundamental question that arises is: To what extent is the judicial model of decision-making appropriate and feasible in the administrative process? Is it both theoretically and practically valid?
The question is put in these terms because, to a greater or lesser
degree, the judicial model is the basis of the major reform proposals.
The Landis report represents the only significant exception, and
his proposals have been largely rejected as a basis for procedural
reform.
In essence, what is the nature of the judicial model? First, it is
oriented to the protection of the individual where his rights have
been challenged, impaired, or affected in any way. The fundamental premise of the judicial model is that it affords the best protection to individuals because it is the most efficient and accurate factfinding mechanism available in adjudication. Further, the facts
that are determined will develop directly from the circumstances
and position of the individuals involved in the case and controversy. Extraneous factors will not be considered, and may not form
part of the record. In other words the record will be made by the
parties to the dispute. The fact-finding procedures, then, that have
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been so carefully nurtured in the judicial process are designed more
to affect individual interest than an external "public interest" defined as something apart from the specific interests of individuals
directly involved in the proceedings. The mechanisms of the judicial model, viz., notice, a hearing in which strict rules of evidence
prevail and cross-examination is permitted; a decision on the record; and limited right of appeal, are well designed to implement
the individual-oriented goals of the system. The individual is protected insofar as he can be in adjudication when this procedure is
used.
Most of the proposals of current interest are based upon an acceptance of the premises of the judicial model. Aspects of these
proposals which illustrate this are those which extend hearing
requirements in administrative adjudication and emphasize the importance of the presiding officer. Further, proposals to extend judicial review fit this pattern. All of these, as embodied, for example, in the Code of Federal Administrative Procedure, are oriented toward the protection of the individual.
It is not within the scope of this article to suggest a definitive
system of administrative justice, even if that were possible. A
few tentative considerations, however, should be noted regarding
the appropriateness of the judicial model in administrative law.
First, there is little doubt that this model affords in many instances
greater protection to particular interests involved in administrative adjudication, by giving them greater opportunity to participate in the formulation of the record upon which the decision is
based, and by affording them better access to the courts of appeal.
In addition, the strict regulation of ex parte communication prevents any undue consideration to a particular party. Thus, all
parties to adjudicative proceedings are protected by this type of
control. On the other hand, it should be reemphasized that the
bulk of administrative adjudication is handled informally, and in
this area the judicial model cannot be introduced. Adjudication of
this type is generally voluntarily accepted by parties subject to
administrative jurisdiction. Any formalization of the administrative process will necessarily exclude its most significant portion.
The need for speed, limited expense, and lack of publicity, which
prevail to a far greater degree in the informal than in the formal
adjudicative realm, precludes most parties from appealing an informal decision either to the formal administrative process or to
the courts. In this respect it is also important to note the limited
applicability of proposals to extend judicial review to informal
administrative adjudication. From the standpoint of private parties the factors noted above would generally preclude appeal, and
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if this were not the case the courts would be deluged with a volume of requests they could not handle.
A second important consideration involving the compatibility
of the judicial model to administrative law concerns the proper
relationship that should exist between substantive policy and adjudication in the administrative process. This has been discussed
at length previously.8 0 It is relevant at this point to note that a
strict application of the judicial model renders the decision-makersjudges or administrators less flexible in applying policy to adjudication. A strong argument can be made that administrative agencies, charged with broad policy-making responsibilities, should have
a high degree of flexibility in this area. At the present time the APA
provides this, whereas the proposed Code of Federal Administrative
Procedure and several other current proposals would severely restrict the freedom of agencies through the elimination of exemptions and the enhancement of the position of the presiding officer
in adjudication.
In the third place, a question can be raised concerning the effectiveness of the judicial model to the determination of the facts
upon which administrative decisions frequently must be based.
The types of cases and characteristics of personnel involved in
many court cases differ markedly from their administrative counterparts. The formal testimonial process of proof, for example, is
designed to keep irrelevancies and prejudicial matter away from
juries and to gain the advantage of demeanor evidence. Juries are
characterized by a lack of continuity and expertise, and in this sense
are quite different from administrators involved ir*adjudication.
The fact-gathering machinery of the judicial model may be quite
inappropriate to administrative decision-making. For example, demeanor evidence is of little importance in administrative proceedings, and such procedural devices as cross-examination are cumbersome in making expert determinations. Further, in many cases
it is doubtful that a record, supplied almost entirely by the parties
directly involved in adjudication, will provide an adequate factual
basis for an administrative agency to render a proper decision.
All of these considerations lead to the conclusion that what
is needed in administrative law is not stricter control through
legislation that requires the judicial model as a basis for administrative decision-making in adjudication, but rather flexibility within a very broad framework of control. No one should object to
tightening the requirements of the APA in certain respects, e.g.,
making it applicable to deportation proceedings; however, a whole80

See text discussion at note 12 supra and following.
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sale transformation of judicial procedure to administrative law is
undesirable. Although the Code of Federal Administrative Procedure does not indiscriminately apply the judicial model to administrative procedure, it is stricter in this regard than the APA.
Perhaps the most notable feature of the Code is its vast expansion
of judicial review of administrative decisions. Because of the difficulties of using the judicial model in administrative law, and because of the increasing importance of informal administrative adjudication, it is doubtful that the Code would accomplish the objectives sought by its framers. While recognizing the importance
of the contributions made by present and past American Bar Association committees in administrative law, it is suggested that a more
flexible set of controls will achieve administrative justice, in terms
of balancing the rights of the individual, public policy requirements,
and accurate fact-finding, more readily than will the present emphasis upon the primacy of the judicial model.

